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In 1871, the German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller (1832–1888) moved from his
Basel chair to the much better paid chair in Tartu, and taught there until his un-
timely death. Besides philosophy, he had studied various disciplines, including the
natural sciences. In the preparation of his own philosophy, he explored the history
of philosophy formore than twenty years andmade pioneering contributions to the
history of concepts. Only by the early-1880s did he begin to elaborate his “new phi-
losophy,” an original version of personalism, both anti-idealist and anti-materialist.
He did this in three major works (Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt 1882, Re-
ligionsphilosophie 1886, Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik, posthumous
1889) which built upon each other. Unwritten remained the keystone of his philos-
ophy, the Philosophie des Christentums, in which Teichmüller wanted to show that
the philosophical contents of Christianity were encapsulated by his own person-
alism. One major objective of his philosophy, as I see it, was regaining reality—in
particular the reality of the person—aer it had been lost in thewake of the failure of
modern representationalism. Notwithstanding its coherentist elements, I see Teich-
müller’s philosophy as a precursor of direct realism. Although he fell into oblivion
soon aer, his thoughts were received throughout Europe, notably by Friedrich Ni-
etzsche, Aleksey Kozlov and Nicholas Lossky. His extensive literary remains, which
are kept in Basel, remain to be explored.
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1. Financial constraints
On November 28, 1870, Gustav Teichmüller decided to leave his Basel chair
of philosophy for Tartu. It was not an easy decision. In fact, his wife Caro-
line (Lina) Cramer was from Narva and her family was still living there, but
Corresponding author’s address: Heiner Schwenke,eologische Fakultät, Nadelberg 10, CH-
4051 Basel, Switzerland. Email: heiner.schwenke@unibas.ch.
© All Copyright Author
Studia Philosophica Estonica (2015) 8.2, 104–128





she did not want to change sunny Basel for chilly Tartu.1 Teichmüller felt ex-
traordinarily comfortable in Basel, too. It was money that tipped the scales
for Tartu. Unlike today, at that time a professor was able to earn almost three
times as much money in Tartu as in Basel. Teichmüller could not support
his family in Switzerland. e annual subsidy he had to request from his
father-in-law exceeded his own Basel salary (see Schwenke 2006, 46–53).
2. “e most learned young man I ever saw”
Tartu was lucky with its new acquisition.e new professor was one of the
most learned philosophers of his generation. Besides philosophy, he had
studied numerous other disciplines with many luminaries of his time: ar-
chaeology and the Classics including Egyptian hieroglyphs, theology, his-
torical science, political science, physics, chemistry, physiology, anatomy,
pathology, geology, geography, and meteorology.2 His education already at-
tracted attention in his student years. 3 In the summer of 1853, the twenty
year-old Teichmüller went on a journey through Switzerland. Just before
the ascent into the High Alps, he by chance met the then well-known and
inuential Presbyterian author Samuel Irenaeus Prime fromNewYork.ey
were drawn to each other immediately and hiked while discoursing for sev-
eral weeks across the High Alps from Altdorf to Geneva. Prime was deeply
impressed by the erudition of his young companion. In his book Letters from
Switzerland, he devoted several enthusiastic pages to the vast knowledge and
inquiringmind of his interlocutor, and concluded: “Hewas themost learned
young man I ever saw. And few old men knew half as much” (Prime 1860,
107–109).4
3. An excellent academic teacher
But Tartu’s new professor of philosophy did not only possess extraordinar-
ily wide and profound knowledge, he was also very capable of conveying it
to the students. From written testimonials we must conclude that he was
an outstanding academic teacher. His auditoriums were always packed, al-
though he used to lecture in the largest lecture hall of Tartu university. He
used to speak freely, without any notes. Although his talk was very system-
1 See the letter of Caroline Teichmüller to her father Georg Cramer of November 29, 1870,
TeichmüllerNachlassBasel (hereaer: Nachlass), B 347, printed in (Schwenke 2006, 51–52).
2 See the various lecture notebooks in Nachlass A VIII 1-65, and (Schwenke 2006, 30–31).
3 For the following, see (Schwenke 2006, 17–21).
4 For the identication of Prime’s character “Heinrich” with Gustav Teichmüller, see
(Schwenke 2006, 21–25).
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atic, it was intriguing and peppered with examples from many elds.5
According to contemporary witnesses, Teichmüller’s personal interac-
tion with his students was fascinating. Each semester he held a “practicum,”
a practical course, where everybody could ask him questions without fear
that they would be ignored or ridiculed. In discussions he never exercised
his professorial authority. Rudolf Kallas, an Estonian theologian, not only
praised Teichmüller’s capacity to respond to the level of his students, his lu-
cidity and the simplicity of his explanations, but also his humbleness before
his students. He always wanted to learn, Kallas wrote. But most impres-
sive for Kallas was Teichmüller’s joy of contact with his students, joy of their
personal development.6
With regard to academic achievements, Teichmüller did Tartu credit,
too. He was a ground-breaking researcher and a prolic author. In his sev-
enteen Tartu years he authored eighteen books,7 some of them seminal and
comprehensive.
4. Loneliness in Tartu
Perhaps Teichmüller was not quite as happy with Tartu as Tartu was with
him. Admittedly, he did not seem to have a serious shortage of money any
more, despite his huge family. Moreover, his teaching load was lighter than
in Basel, so more time remained for research and writing (see Schwenke
2006, 52 n. 103). But it was disadvantageous that he was the only academic
philosopher in Tartu. erefore, he had no interlocutor at his own level.
Moreover, he certainly had many listeners, but only a few regular students
of philosophy (in 1881, only one).8 Only a couple of these strove for an aca-
demic career andwere capable of amore profound philosophical discussion.
In addition, the remoteness of Tartu cut him o from German philosophi-
cal discourse. His works were largely disregarded there. Hence, he felt quite
isolated in Tartu and repeatedly tried to return to Germany (see Schwenke
2006, 54–58).
5. Teichmüller’s theme: the reality of the person
Teichmüller’s philosophical guiding theme or leitmotiv was the reality of
the person, a term he uses almost interchangeably with self, individual, and
soul. At the age of 22 he wrote a treatise on the immortality of the soul
5 See (Bobrov 1899, 33–34), German translation in (Schwenke 2006, 38–39), and (Lu-
tosławski 1888, 15–16), reprinted in (Schwenke 2006, 39–40).
6 Letter of Rudolf Kallas to Caroline Teichmüller of June 30, 1888 (Nachlass B F 1d), partly
published in (Schwenke 2006, 40–41).
7 See bibliography.
8 See Nachlass F III 67.
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in Plato, which he published in revised form in 1874 in his important Stu-
dien zur Geschichte der Begrie (Studies in the History of Concepts) (Teich-
müller 1874a, 105–222).9 e doctrine of immortality is the best touchstone
for “individual principles,” he wrote (Teichmüller 1874a, 108; all translations
by H.S.). He criticised the fact that there were no individual principles in
Plato, the individual being only a transient composition of general elements
(Teichmüller 1874a, 114–115).10 Teichmüller concluded that personal immor-
tality is not compatible with Plato’s scientic philosophy.11 He also blamed
Leibniz for equating his monads with Plato’s ideas (Teichmüller 1874a, 108).
But it took thirty years until Teichmüller presented his own philosophy of
the person to the academic public.
6. Scrupulosity and an untimely death
Provoked by the disregard and polemical disparagement of his books, Teich-
müller’s later writings are full of irony and sarcasm about his philosophical
opponents. One might think of him as a quite self-condent thinker lack-
ing in self-criticism.e reverse is true. Although his foremost goal was the
development of a new philosophy, he rst studied the history of philosophy
for almost three decades. He wanted to learn for his own benet to avoid an
unconscious reproduction of old ideas and to be sure to produce something
really new. He dared to communicate the beginnings of his own philoso-
phy only in some ’popular writings’. When he had sent the manuscript of
Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, his rst systematic masterpiece, to his
publisher, Rudolf Kallas met him the next morning and found him quite af-
icted and agitated. WhenKallas asked him for the reason, he answered: “All
night I have been shaken by the fear that all the new things I have written
are wrong.”12 His death at the age of 55, due to a sudden outbreak of stomach
cancer, was a tragedy, for it prevented him from elaborating his philosophy
in full. On his deathbed he wrote to his disciple Jakob Ohse: “When I think
of my unnished works [. . . ], I want to weep.”13
7. Studies in the History of Concepts
Before giving a survey of Teichmüller’s works, I wish to point out that many
of his writings are very demanding and complex—notwithstanding their un-
9 For the history of this essay, see (Teichmüller 1884, 135).
10 See also (Teichmüller 1876a, 3–4).
11 See also (Teichmüller 1873, 145, 154; Teichmüller 1874b, 161; Teichmüller 1876a; Teichmüller
1879, 383–385, 426–428; Teichmüller 1881, 246–247; Teichmüller 1884, 135–178). Teich-
müller especially attacked his opponent, Eduard Zeller (Teichmüller 1876a).
12 Letter of Rudolf Kallas to Caroline Teichmüller of June 30, 1888 (Nachlass B F 1d).
13 Letter to Jakob Ohse of April 27, 1888, partly printed in (Schwenke 2006, 61).
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pretentious, accessible language. My overview will therefore necessarily re-
main sketchy and supercial.
At rst Teichmüller acquired his philosophical armamentarium from
studies inAristotle (Teichmüller 1859a; Teichmüller 1859b; Teichmüller 1867;
Teichmüller 1869; Teichmüller 1873). But already in the third volume of his
Aristotelische Forschungen (Aristotelian Researches), the Geschichte des Be-
gris der Parusie (History of the concept of parousia), he turned towards a
history of concepts.14 For Teichmüller, a history of concepts was the rst
requirement for philosophical progress. It helps to recognise more clearly
the roots of current philosophical problems and to avoid answers that have
already failed (Teichmüller 1874a, iii).15
8. Egyptian roots of Greek Philosophy
In his attempts to understand the origins of philosophy, he made not only
Plato andAristotle, but also the presocratics a themeof a series of remarkable
treatises (Teichmüller 1876b, 1–248).16 It was quite uncommon that Teich-
müller did not assume that philosophy startedwith theGreeks. He employed
his knowledge of the hieroglyphs and archaeological ndings to show an at
least indirect impact of Egyptian thought on early Greek philosophy (Teich-
müller 1878, 103–253),17 a thesis which deviated from the prevailing opinion
of his time.18
9. Platonism and Christianity
Teichmüller’smain philosophical theme, the reality of the person, shaped his
historical studies. Again and again, he discussed the relation of Platonism to
Christianity.19 He argued that Christianity possesses a true principle of the
individual, but that it has been obscured by the cloak of Hellenistic idealism.
14 For a detailed analysis and discussion of Teichmüller’s history of concepts, see Gottfried
Gabriel, “Gustav Teichmüller and the systematic signicance of studying the history of
concepts” (this volume) and Wolfgang Rother, “Gustav Teichmüllerseorie der Begri-
sgeschichte” (Rother 2010).
15 See also (Teichmüller 1876b, viii; Teichmüller 1882, xxii–xxiv and Nachlass A X 6, printed
in (Schwenke 2006, 114–116). On Teichmüller’s project of a history of concepts, see also
the remarks of Nicolai Hartmann (1909, 6).
16 (Teichmüller 1878, 103–253, see also 279–288).
17 See the recent article of the Egyptologist Sergei Stadnikov (2007). Teichmüller had jour-
neyed through Egypt in 1863/64 and had learned the hieroglyphs with Heinrich Karl
Brugsch in Göttingen.
18 See the quote of Wilamowitz-Möllendor in (Stadnikov 2007, 83 n. 9).
19 See e.g. (Teichmüller 1884, 1): “e most important and most interesting problems of the
history of the human intellect are about two events that exerted the strongest inuence on
the development of mankind, Christianity and Platonism.”
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is might have inspired one of Teichmüller’s students, Adolf von Harnack,
whose slogan of the Hellenisation of Christianity became quite famous later
on.
10. Early sketches: monadological panpsychism, projectivism,
and perspectivism
Besides his voluminous historical works, Teichmüller published some mi-
nor, popular writings which contained early dras of his own philosophy.
In his Ueber die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (On the Immortality of the Soul) of
1874, probably his most read book, we come across a monadological pan-
psychism. e real world consists of a multitude of independent psychic
individuals. ere is no material world. Sensual appearances or ideas arise
from the impact of one psychic being on another. e belief in the reality
of a material world is caused by an unconscious projection of our sensual
ideas onto the external world.is projectivism is probably partly inspired
by Teichmüller’s teacher in physiology, the eminent Johannes Müller.
His essay Darwinismus und Philosophie (Darwinism and Philosophy)
from 1877 is dedicated to Karl-Ernst von Baer, whomTeichmüller personally
knew fromhis Petersburg period of 1856-1860. Darwinismus undPhilosophie
already contains Teichmüller’s perspectivism, which was to explain the illu-
sion of time and space.is illusion results from the fact that a nite individ-
ual is bound to a certain position and therefore necessarily has a perspective
on the world. Before and aer, right and le do not exist in themselves but
only in relation to a certain point of view. Without a certain standpoint, one
would be at the same moment everywhere and therefore would not be able
to measure an interval, and time and space would disappear (Teichmüller
1877, 40–50).
In his Ueber das Wesen der Liebe (On the essence of love) of 1879, Teich-
müller applies his perspectivism to ethics. In 1879 Lotze’s Metaphysik also
appeared; here Teichmüller’s friend abandoned the substantiality of the per-
son. is was something of a shock for Teichmüller,20 and he apparently
felt urged to elaborate and publish his own philosophy. He wrote three large
books which built upon each other.e rst was, as already mentioned,
11. Die wirkliche und die scheinbareWelt—NeueGrundlegung der
Metaphysik (e Real and the Apparent world: New Founda-
tion of Metaphysics) (1882)
Very much like Martin Heidegger almost 50 years later in his Sein und Zeit
(Being and Time), on the rst page of the book, Teichmüller raises the ques-
20 See his letter to Lotze ofMarch 12, 1879 (NachlassB 1752), printed in (Lotze 2003, 659–660).
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tion of the sense of being. e concept of being seems to him the most ne-
glected question ofmetaphysics.21e reasonwhy this question is so impor-
tant for Teichmüller lies at the core of his personalism. If psychic individuals
represent actual reality and the material world is only appearance, then we
cannot take the concept of being (and of substance) from thematerial world
but only from the psychic realm. Because we have only indirect, semiotic
access22 to other individuals,23 and can only infer their being (Teichmüller
1882, 73), the only source of the notion of being is the immediate knowledge
a person has of herself. Teichmüller calls the immediate access to oneself
self-consciousness. e self is the paradigm, the prototype of being and sub-
stance, as he puts it in a later book (Teichmüller 1889, 171–174). For him,
the idea of substantiality is not taken from somewhere else, e.g. the mate-
rial world, and applied to the self, but taken from our experience of the self
and applied to other phenomena. e self is no theoretical construct, but
a reality with which we are intuitively acquainted. Self-consciousness is a
main pillar of Teichmüller’s personalism. He strictly distinguishes it from
inferential self-knowledge.24
Especially interesting is Teichmüller’s distinction of three kinds of being.
Firstly, the content of our thinking possesses ideal being (Teichmüller 1889,
99–102, see also 17, 182).25 Ideal being approximately corresponds to later
concepts like Frege’s “third realm” (see Frege 1918), or Popper’s “World 3”
(Popper 1977, 36–50). Secondly, the acts and states of the soul or self have
real being. Here the issue is not what we think or feel, but that we think or
feel (Teichmüller 1882, 53–54).26 irdly, psychic or mental acts and states
always belong to someone, to a self, who thinks, senses, feels, and wants
(Teichmüller 1889, 160). is self has substantial being (Teichmüller 1882,
56–59, 67–79; Teichmüller 1889, 171–174).
In this book, Teichmüller elaborates his relational theory of concepts
as the methodological basis for his conceptual investigations.27 For him,
the sum of concepts forms a “net” or a “map”(Teichmüller 1882, 14–15) in
21 Dickopp (1970) noticed already that the beginnings of Teichmüller’s and Heidegger’s book
were quite similar.
22 For Teichmüller’s concept of semiotic knowledge, see (Schwenke 2006, 181–190). Teich-
müller already used ‘Semiotik’ for knowledge from signs in a lecture on logics in 1860 with
reference to medical diagnostics where “semiotics” was a common terminus technicus at
that time (see Nachlass A I 4). See also (Teichmüller 1878, 187).
23 See e.g. (Teichmüller 1882, 137).
24 See e.g. (Teichmüller 1889, 158–161).
25 An earlier, broader concept of ideal being is developed in (Teichmüller 1882, 51–53).
26 Husserl’s distinction between noësis and noëma resembles to a certain extent Teichmüller’s
concepts of real and ideal being, respectively.
27 For Teichmüller’s relational theory of concepts, see Wolfgang Rother’s elucidating article
(Rother 2010).
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which every concept is dened by its place and by its connections with other
concepts. is “topography” (Teichmüller 1886, 16) of concepts represents
the “form,” the structure of the real world (see Teichmüller 1886, 217). In an
unclear, unconscious form it exists in every humanmind (Teichmüller 1882,
13–16). e philosopher’s task is to raise these pre-existing concepts into
consciousness and to determine their true place within the whole system.
Aer dealing with the real world and ontology, Teichmüller turns to the
apparent world and phenomenology in the second part of theWirkliche und
scheinbare Welt. He elaborates his perspectivism in detail in order to prove
that the physical world is not real. Time, space, andmotion are constructs of
themind. Knowledge about them is no knowledge about the external world,
but only about our own constructional activity.28 It is generally acknowl-
edged that Teichmüller’s former Basel colleague, Nietzsche, adopted and
radicalised Teichmüller’s perspectivism, though without mentioning him.29
It should further be mentioned that Teichmüller’s operationalist arguments
for a strict relativity of duration (Teichmüller 1882, 210-212) resemble Ein-
stein’s later reections on the concept of simultaneousness (see e.g. Einstein
1988, 14). Moreover, Teichmüller’s strict distinction between time and dura-
tion (see Teichmüller 1882, 207–215) and between a subjectively experienced
duration and an innitely divisible objective duration (see e.g. Teichmüller
1882, 306) might have inspired Bergson to develop his concepts of “temps”
and “durée” (see Bergson 1889, 57–106).30
In the last chapter and in the long, substantial preface, Teichmüller ob-
viously extends the scope of perspectivism. Now he not only considers a
sensual, but a conceptual perspectivist worldview as well. He is seeking a
general explanation of why most earlier philosophies missed the reality of
the self. Teichmüller’s diagnosis is self-oblivion: Either the previous philoso-
phies dissolve the self into physiological, material elements or processes or
they lose it in general concepts and constructs. In both cases, a certain con-
tent of consciousness—that is, a part of the ideal being—is projected onto
an external world and taken for true reality. Materialist-empiricist philoso-
phies take primarily sensory-content, idealist philosophies conceptual con-
tent, for reality. In doing so, they utterly forget the self, the real person who
28 Teichmüller’s constructivism resembles the methodical contructivism of the Erlangen
School, except for the fact that he takes not bodily but only mental actions into account.
See e.g. Peter Janich: A proposition about space is no empirical judgement (“Erfahrungs-
urteil”), but expresses knowledge of our own actions (“Wissen über unsere Handlungen”)
(Janich 1997, 125).
29 See (Nohl 1913; Small 1994, 183–184; Schwenke 2006, 257–262).
30 Bergson might have learnt about Teichmüller’s thoughts through his teacher Émile
Boutroux, who obviously read and appreciated Teichmüller’s works (see his letter to Te-
ichmüller of March 6, 1887, partly printed in Szyłkarski 1940a, xlvii).
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senses and thinks (Teichmüller 1882, 346). e reality of the self cannot be
found within the eld of ideal being. But without a self there would be no
thinking, feeling, and sensing, and no ideal being at all.
e book’s outlook refers to the next project, the philosophy of religion.
Philosophy does not discover new truths, but can only clarify the natural
philosophy of mankind, like the extraction of metals from ore (Teichmüller
1882, 347). If no singular problems but whole worldviews are in question,
the ore, the material of philosophy, are the religions (Teichmüller 1882, 347).
ey contain the dierent worldviews in “unschooled form.”erefore, Te-
ichmüller was deeply interested in the philosophical content of religions. Fol-
lowing this line, he wrote his largest book, the
12. Religionsphilosophie (Philosophy of Religion) (1886)
is work is not so much a philosophy of the phenomenon of religion in
general, as the title might indicate, but rather an analysis of the philosophi-
cal content of the various religions. Teichmüller not only draws on written
doctrines, but also takes cults into account. e book is an early instance
of an inter-cultural philosophy of religion. Although Teichmüller favours
the putative personalist content of Christianity, he argues for an absolute
independence of philosophical argumentation from religious doctrine and
revelation (Teichmüller 1886, xxvii–xix).
Against aHegelian orDarwinian history of the development of religions,
Teichmüller places a systematic classication. He epistemologically divides
the religions into three levels: the projective, the pantheist and theChristian-
personalist (Teichmüller 1886, 99–107). Initially he intended to deal with all
three levels, but then postponed the third level for another book. On the
level of projective religion, man projects his concept of God onto the exter-
nal world and thereby creates a god (Teichmüller 1886, 101, 114). Religious
projection is unmasked by atheism. It prepares the ground for the second
level of religion, pantheism, in which god is taken back into the self. But
thereby the self is displaced by god (Teichmüller 1886, 104–105, 378–380).31
In Pantheism, there exists nomultitude of independent beings, but only god.
e book ends with an outlook on the still to be written personalist philos-
ophy of Christianity. On this level, man as a self-dependent being faces god
without perspective illusiveness and without pantheistic volatility of the self
(Teichmüller 1886, 101–102). However, most of the elements of Christianity
have nothing to do with the personalist, third level, but belong to the rst
or second level of religion: not only the belief in miracles, but also the doc-
31 Teichmüller does not say much about why the self is displaced by god when the projection
of god is taken back into the self.
Heiner Schwenke 113
trine of substitution which says that Jesus suered and died as our proxy and
thereby added to our merits and redeemed us (Teichmüller 1886, 326–328,
333–334).
Teichmüller probably postponed the philosophy of Christianity because
new problems had emerged. Like Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, the
Religionsphilosophie is only a snapshot of the development of Teichmüller’s
thought. Again a comprehensive preface presents new ideas. For the rst
time he regards a strict distinction between consciousness and knowledge as
the very centre of his philosophy (see Schwenke 2006, 192–194, 217–224). It
seems that he began to realize more clearly that direct cognitive access to re-
alitywas not reconcilablewith his own coherentist concept of knowledge. He
undertook a preliminary investigation in which the nature of consciousness
and its separation from knowledge was to be established. For Teichmüller,
this topic belonged to psychology, for it was a question of the correct divi-
sion of the functions of the soul (Teichmüller 1886, vii). is is one of the
reasons why he named his new book the
13. Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik (New Founda-
tion of Psychology and Logics) (postumous 1889)
Because of his untimely death, Teichmüller could not quite nish this book.
It was edited by his disciple and condant JakobOhse andpublished one year
aer his death. It appears quite complete, but Teichmüller intended to revise
some paragraphs and to add two more chapters.32 One of the main themes
is the distinction between consciousness and knowledge. Furthermore, the
book contains an eminent chapter on the self.erein Teichmüller refers to
his philosophy as personalism for the rst time.33 Although it is not men-
tioned in the text, it is clear from the context of his work and also from his
correspondence that with this book he wanted to pursue his project of a
personalist philosophy of Christianity. In a letter he wrote: “e theory of
consciousness which I foreshadowed [ine Philosophy of Religion] is the
real scientic road that leads to Christianity.”34
Because of conceptual obscurity and ambiguity, Teichmüller’s central
distinction of consciousness and knowledge requires careful analysis and
reconstruction (see Schwenke 2006, 159–224). Basically, he takes conscious-
ness for immediate knowledge or immediate access to reality. Consciousness
32 See the preface of Ohse in (Teichmüller 1889, ii-iv).
33 e Enzyklopädie Philosophie undWissenschastheorie erroneously claims that “personal-
ism” as a self-description of a philosophical position rst occurred in Renouvier in 1903
(Mittelstraß 1995, 92).
34 Letter of November 4, 1886 (Nachlass B 3186).e recipient was probably BernhardWeiss
(1827-1918), professor of theology in Berlin.
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constitutes an element of direct realism in his epistemology. In my view, it is
a reaction to the loss of reality of modern European philosophy (Schwenke
2006, 150–157). Not only the so-called external world, but also the reality of
the self and its states and actionswere in danger of becoming only ideas, con-
cepts, or, as Teichmüller puts it, “ideal being.”e epistemological situation
to which Teichmüller reacted shall be described in some detail below.
14. Background:e failure of representationalism35
In European epistemology, varieties of representationalism—according to
which knowledge consists in either a pictorial or an abstract correspondence
of a person’s ideas (representations)with reality—prevailed. Onemainweak-
ness of representationalism lies in the impossibility of checking the corre-
spondence, i.e. determining truth and error. If the epistemic subject has
no direct access to reality, but access only by mediation of representations,
it can never nd out whether its representations reliably correspond to re-
ality. Even more, the subject cannot determine whether there exists a re-
ality beyond its representations at all. In modernity, this problem was in-
creasingly addressed. Because one could not take the unreachable reality as
the yardstick of truth, philosophers sought properties of the representations
themselves whichmight indicate their relation to reality, such as their clarity,
distinctiveness, spontaneousness, or their coherence with other representa-
tions. But this strategy had to fail, for one cannot check the reliability of
certain properties of representations as a criterion of truth without already
knowing reality and truth in another way.e introduction of external guar-
antors of the reliability of our representations, e.g. god or natural selection,
only meant begging the question, because claiming knowledge about these
guarantors presupposes that the problem in question has been solved al-
ready.
15. Flight to idealism
It is striking thatmodernEuropean epistemology abstained froma satisfying
access to reality or even from reality itself rather than amending or replac-
ing representationalism with elements of direct realism. David Hume stated
without regret that one can never reach any kind of existence beyond our
perceptions (Hume 1739, I. II. 6). Immanuel Kant paved the way for a com-
plete elimination of a reality beyond representations. In fact, he assumed
things-in-themselves as an external cause of appearances (that are represen-
35 See (Schwenke 2006, 126–150) for more detail and references.
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tations in my sense).36 However, according to his own system, this was an
illegal application of the category of causality. Hence, it was not surprising
that external things-in-themselves were abolished by later philosophers.37
Only the world of representations, ideal being, remained.
16. e disappearance of the real self
is is also true of the so-called internal world. Locke had applied repre-
sentationalism to the inner world, too (Locke 1690, II. I. 4). Between the
epistemic subject and its thinking, sensing, and feeling, there were repre-
sentations as well. Furthermore, the inner world could not be known di-
rectly.38 e psychic and mental acts and states, and their bearer, vanished
behind representations and nally became only ideas themselves. Man did
not only loose the world, but also himself.39 Because there was no reference
to a world beyond representations any more (Willaschek 2003, 2), knowl-
edge was subsequently oen seen to consist in a coherent system of repre-
sentations or ideas.
17. Metaphors of isolation
e isolation of the epistemic subject in modern philosophy is illustrated by
the epistemic metaphors of the time. e epistemic subject was locked up
in a kind of vessel or dungeon.40 Sociologist Norbert Elias called the man
of modernity the “homo clausus” (Elias 1976, lxi). Teichmüller also spoke
of “immured souls” when he referred to modern epistemology (Teichmüller
1889, 58). e idea that the epistemic subject is isolated from reality not
only furthered epistemological idealism, but also ontological idealism, which
I take as the doctrine that there is nothing except ideas or representations
(see Schwenke 2006, 147–148).
36 “[V]on dem, was sie an sich selbst seinmögen, wissen wir nichts, sondern kennen nur ihre
Erscheinungen, d. i. die Vorstellungen, die sie in uns wirken” (Kant 1783, 63).
37 Inter alia by F.H. Jacobi, A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche. For references see (Eisler 1904,
223–225).
38 See (Kant 1781/1787, A 22 / B 37): “[D]er innere Sinn [. . . ] gibt [. . . ] keine Anschauung von
der Seele selbst,” and (Kant 1781/1787, B 158): “[I]ch habe also demnach keine Erkenntnis
von mir, wie ich bin, sondern bloß, wie ich mir selbst erscheine.”
39 See Hume, for whom there were only “impressions and ideas,” but no self anymore (Hume
1739, I. IV. 6); see also (Willaschek 2003, 116).
40 See (Schwenke 2006, 131–132). Examples are Locke’s cabinet or Leibniz’s monad without
any windows.
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18. Teichmüller’s objective: back to reality
Teichmüller’s distinction between consciousness and knowledge ranks
among the epistemological attempts to regain reality. His concept of con-
sciousness allows for direct epistemic contact with reality. But Teichmüller
could only partly elude idealism. e epistemic isolation of the subject re-
garding the outside world was self-evident to him. e only object of con-
sciousness is the so-called inner world: the self, its actions and states (Te-
ichmüller 1889, 160; Teichmüller 1882, 32), and God, who is present within
the self, but not identical with it (Teichmüller 1886, vii; Teichmüller 1889,
40, 79). Immediate access to the external world is impossible (Teichmüller
1874b, 95–96; Teichmüller 1882, 129, 137).
19. Entangled with idealism
Teichmüller found it extremely dicult to introduce direct knowledge be-
cause his concept of knowledge stands within the Hegelian tradition. For
him, true knowledge is always mediate and inferential. Knowledge is a con-
clusion, he states every now and then, and even more: knowledge is only
possible within a coherent logical system (see Schwenke 2006, 165–171). He
therefore did notwant to call immediate knowledge “knowledge,” but named
it “consciousness,” or, atmost, “knowledge in an improper sense of theword”
(Teichmüller 1882, 101; see Schwenke 2006, 191–192).
20. Further development of Teichmüller’s anti-idealism by
Lossky
Teichmüller’s anti-idealist project did not go far enough. In his view, we only
have mediate knowledge of other beings, save God. In my opinion, his epis-
temology can at best support the belief in the existence of some other being
or beings in general, but it is not able to elucidate our life-world commerce
with ourUmwelt and our fellowman in particular. Moreover, his purely sub-
jectivist concept of the material world is somewhat counter-intuitive, to say
the least (see Schwenke 2006, 250–253). However, there was a continuation
of Teichmüller’s anti-idealist project by Russian philosophers. With his con-
cept of the consciousness of God, Teichmüller had opened a gap in the wall
around the isolated epistemic subject. God was directly known but was not
the self. e consciousness of God represented the rst step towards direct
knowledge of the so-called external world, asNicholasO. Lossky recognised.
He wrote: “If you remove the partition wall, rstly, between the monad and
God, and, secondly, between it and the rest of the monads, then you will de-
rive the doctrine of intuition on the largest scale” (Lossky 1908, 193–194).e
rst step, the introduction of the concept of a consciousness of God, Lossky
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attributes to Aleksey A. Kozlov (Lossky 1908, 193–194).41 But Kozlov had ob-
viously adopted it from Teichmüller, unfortunately without citing him for
this (see Schwenke 2006, 265–269 and Schabad 1940, 52, 152–153). In his
intuitivism, Lossky extended the scope of consciousness, that is, of direct
knowledge to everything. For Lossky, one can in principle know psychic
states of other persons as if they were one’s own. e sharp modern line of
demarcation between the internal and the external world, between subject
and object disappears.e epistemic subject is no longer trapped in a vessel,
but is capable of direct contact with every part of reality. However, Lossky
went too far in limiting knowledge to intuition and dismissing inferential
knowledge. is precludes the possibility of scientic knowledge, which is
always inferential. But to allow for direct access to reality seems to me the
only reasonable way to remedy the shortcomings of pure representational-
ism (see Schwenke 2006, 269–286).
21. Philosophy of Christianity
e philosophy of Christianity, the ultimate goal of Teichmüller’s philos-
ophy, remained unwritten (Schwenke 2006, 60–61). erefore, we do not
knowexactly howTeichmüllerwanted to show that his personalismmatched
the philosophical essence of Christianity. In fact, in 1931, the Estonian the-
ologian Eduard Tennmann published a Philosophie des Christentums (Phi-
losophy of Christianity) from Teichmüller’s literary remains (Nachlass). But
this text of 60 pages does not compensate for the unwritten book Teich-
müller beweeped on his deathbed. It does not contain his new theory of
consciousness, which should have constituted the foundation of the unwrit-
ten book. I believe that Tennmann’s text was penned byTeichmüller’s widow,
Caroline Teichmüller.42 Her raw material was Teichmüller’s manuscript of
his lecture on the Philosophie des Christentums which he gave in 1886. She
transformed the sketchy notes into whole sentences and also incorporated
notes of students (Nachlass A I 28a-c).
22. Teichmüller’s Nachlass in Basel
Teichmüller le extensive, important literary remains (Nachlass). Among
many other things, the Nachlass comprises the manuscripts of 31 lectures,
many unpublished writings, dras and fragments and a very extensive cor-
respondence with many scholars from all over the world. e fate of the
41 Lossky especially refers to Kozlov (1895); see (Lossky 1951, 160).
42 Nachlass A I 28d. I dissent from Szyłkarski (1940a, xlii–xliii), who attributes this
manuscript to a student. See (Schwenke 2006, 105–106).
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Nachlass was quite eventful.43 Soon aer the death of her husband, Car-
oline Teichmüller moved to Jena and took it with her. Aer her death in
1894, the Nachlass was kept by Teichmüller’s eldest daughter, the composer
Anna Teichmüller (1861-1940), who moved to a colony of artists in the Gi-
ant mountains in Silesia. ere the Nachlass was examined in 1920s and
’30s by several scholars, above all Vladimir Szyłkarski from Kaunas and Ed-
uard Tennmann from Tartu. Various longer and shorter manuscripts were
published (Teichmüller 1928; Teichmüller 1931a; Teichmüller 1931b; Teich-
müller 1931g; Teichmüller 1931d; Teichmüller 1931e; Teichmüller 1931f; Te-
ichmüller 1931c; Teichmüller 1940).44 Aer Anna Teichmüller’s death in
September 1940, the Nachlass got lost in the turmoil of the war. In 1948,
a German-Polish physician discovered it in an attic. It was completely dis-
organised. e physician reported his discovery to Anna’s younger sister,
Hertha Brückner-Teichmüller, whose address he found amongst the papers.
She was living in Basel and had become a Swiss citizen. Her husband Arthur
Brückner, a son of the Tartu historian Alexander Brückner (1834-1896), had
become director of the Basel ophthalmic university clinic in 1923. With great
eorts, Hertha Brückner-Teichmüller succeeded in transferring the Nach-
lass from Poland to the Archives of the University Library of Basel. Aer
her death in the same year, the Nachlass fell into almost complete oblivion,
although her family continued to live in Basel. It extends to seven and a half
metres on the shelf. By means of pre-war lists, I discovered that at least the
correspondence suered some losses during World War II, but it is still a
very comprehensive and signicant collection.45
23. Reception and inuence
Teichmüller’s works were read in many countries. As the examples of Niet-
zsche and Kozlov show, he was more read than cited.46 His reception took
place in several threads that were quite isolated from each other. Teich-
müller’s personalism exerted its strongest inuence in Eastern Europe.47 It
43 Most of the following information has been drawn from the Document in Nachlass B* 2.
44e most important is the Logik und Kategorienlehre (Teichmüller 1940), the unnished
second part of Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt (Teichmüller 1882).
45 For a more detailed description of Teichmüller’s Nachlass, see (Schwenke 2006).
46e young Nietzsche was already familiar with Teichmüller’s thoughts (see e.g. Venturelli
1994); he was probably also inspired by Teichmüller’s approach to the history of concepts
(see Tuusvuori 2000, 314, 357).
47 Apart from the aforementioned reception by Kozlov and Lossky, see (Kallas 1897; Ten-
nmann 1928b; Tennmann 1928a; Tennmann 1931; Kulpa 1934; Vaska 1964; Strods 1984;
Bobrov 1898; Szyłkarski 1935/1936; Szyłkarski 1938; Szyłkarski 1940a Szyłkarski 1940c;
Szyłkarski 1940b Szyłkarski 1954). For Teichmüller’s inuence on philosophy in Eastern
Europe, see (Szyłkarski 1940a, xlvi); for his inuence on Russian philosophy in particular,
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was suppressed by communism, but aer the dissolution of the Soviet Union
some new interest in Teichmüller emerged (see e.g. Trošin 1998; Schwenke
2009a; Schwenke 2009b; Hiršs 2015). Among German philosophers, he
was rst of all perceived as a source of Nietzsche’s perspectivism (see Nohl
1913 and Dickopp 1970), much like in Spain (see e.g. Ferrater Mora 1981,
3202 and Marías 1967, 348), whereas in France and Italy his historical works
were mainly discussed.48 e Suisse National Science Foundation recently
funded an annotated edition of Teichmüller’s major theoretical works (see
Teichmüller 2015a,b,c). It is quite striking that Teichmüller received much
less attention in Germany than in some other countries.49
It is also worth noting that, on the one hand, Teichmüller is quite un-
known; but, on the other hand, he enjoyed remarkable esteem among schol-
ars from various countries who had studied his works more closely. In his
popularGeschichte der Philosophie (History of philosophy), Johannes Hirsch-
berger places Teichmüller alongside Bolzano and ventures to forecast that
his time is still to come (Hirschberger 1991, 453).e aforementioned Esto-
nian, Eduard Tennmann, opined that Teichmüller has been widely ignored
“to the great detriment of science and mankind” (Tennmann 1931, iii). e
Spaniard JuliánMarías (1999) rates Teichmüller on the same level as Kierke-
gaard, Nietzsche and Dilthey. e Russian philosopher Aleksey A. Kozlov
praised him as “a star of the rst magnitude within the philosophical world”
(Kozlov 1894/95, 524).50e eminent French historian of science and philos-
ophy, Paul Tannery, admired Teichmüller’s “puissant génie” (Tannery 1889,
495), and the Lithuanian-Polish Philosopher Vladimir Szyłkarski took
Teichmüller for “one of the greatest German philosophers” (Szyłkarski
1929/1930, 205 u. 207).
see (Zenkovsky 1953, 630–703).
48 Paul Tannery devoted a whole series of articles to Teichmüller’s historical researches (Tan-
nery 1880; Tannery 1880/1881; Tannery 1882a; Tannery 1882b; Tannery 1882c; Tannery
1883a; Tannery 1883b; Tannery 1885). For the inuence of Teichmüller on Tannery, see
also (Szyłkarski 1940a, xlvii). For the Italian reception, see e.g. (Chiapelli 1881). Masci
(1887) discussed aspects of Teichmüller’s systematic philosophy. e correspondence of
Teichmüller with various Italian scholars is rendered in (Orsucci and Savorelli 1997).
49 In Germany, only some minor theological (e.g. Pfennigsdorf 1895; Pfennigsdorf 1897;
Pfennigsdorf 1938; Pfennigsdorf 1939; Posselt 1960; Posselt 1964) and philosophical (e.g.
Müller 1900; Müller 1908; Sandmayer 1944) works were devoted to Teichmüller’s philoso-
phy. Aer the Second World War, there were virtually no publications about Teichmüller
in Germany (except Szyłkarski 1954, which was a recapitulation of previous articles, Dick-
opp 1970, and Kühne-Bertram 2007). In Switzerland, (Schabad 1940; Schwenke 2006;
Schwenke 2011) and Schwenke’s introductions and commentaries in (Teichmüller 2015a;
Teichmüller 2015b; Teichmüller 2015c) deal extensively with Teichmüller.
50e expression “star of the rstmagnitude” was also used byGoethe aboutMartinWieland
(see Falk 1832, 62).
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24. Appraisal
Be this as it may, I personally appreciate Teichmüller for choosing an excel-
lent topic, namely the reality of the person, for being a very creative, keen
and systematic thinker, for discussing problems from all sides, so that you
can learn a lot from reading him, and above all, for being an enlightener in
the true sense of the word. He wanted to free mankind from deep-rooted
delusions. Usually enlightenment is thought to be inextricably linked with
modern philosophy and science. But apart from light, modern philosophy
and science have also brought forth darkness, and need to be enlightened
themselves. e idealistic extinction of the individual in favour of the gen-
eral, which Teichmüller so harshly criticised, has contributed to the totali-
tarian disasters of modern history, as Karl R. Popper (1945) pointed out in
hisOpen Society and its Enemies. Materialistic scientism, on the other hand,
is apt to lower the respect for the person as well, and does not add to the
ethical progress of mankind either. In the name of science, the existence of
the self is denied (see e.g. Metzinger 2003) and the best traits of man, love,
charity, and compassion, are exposed as a hidden egoism which only serves
our biological success (see e.g. Wilson 1975; Dawkins 1976).
At the end of my essay, I wish to come back to biography, to life, again.
ose philosophers who decisively shapedmodern epistemology, which en-
tertains doubts concerning the existence of the external world, the existence
of the self, and the possibility of contact with other beings; those philoso-
phers were men—not women, of course—who had neither wives nor chil-
dren. Teichmüller, in contrast, was married and had nine children. More-
over, he was—despite his rationalistic traits—a deeply loving person. Other
persons mattered a lot to him. Both his encounter with Samuel Irenäus
Prime in the High Alps and his friendship with Wilhelm Dilthey in Berlin
(see Schwenke 2006, 34–36) bore the mark of deep aection, almost pas-
sion. Aer the death of his beloved rst wife, Anna Cramer, who died of
childbed fever at the age of nineteen, he was little short of a breakdown (see
Schwenke 2006, 58–59). His love for the younger sister of his deceased wife
was barely less intense, and they married against the strong resistance of her
father.51 Teichmüller himself was a very responsible father to his many chil-
dren. I already mentioned the joy he found in teaching and dealing with his
students. For him not isolation, but love is “the metaphysical nature of all
beings” (Teichmüller 1879, 102).
51 See the private correspondence between Gustav Teichmüller and Caroline Cramer,
Deutsches Tagebucharchiv Emmendingen. A typescript of the correspondence is kept by
Teichmüller’s great-grandson, Markus Brückner, in Basel.
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